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The Dialectics of Bank Capital: Regulation and 
Regulatory Capital Arbitrage 
 
Erik F. Gerding* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Bank capital regulation has surprisingly moved from being a critical 
but boring tool of banking law to a politically contentious topic of 
national debate.  Anat Admati and Martin Hellwig’s book,1 which 
advocates for much higher capital requirements for banks, has received 
scholarly plaudits.2  On the other hand, senior executives of large Wall 
Street banks have attacked proposals for higher capital requirements as 
threatening economic growth.3  On the presidential campaign trail, two 
prominent Republican candidates made higher capital requirements a 
centerpiece of their financial reform proposals.4  Bank capital 
regulations have attracted a wave of excellent legal scholarship on how 
regulators have made these rules,5 how they have enforced them,6 and 
how policymakers ought to rethink the baseline for regulation.7 
In considering the history and efficacy of capital regulations, one   
dynamic deserves much more academic attention than it has received—
 
 *  Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, University of Colorado Law 
School. 
 1. See generally ANAT ADMATI & MARTIN HELLWIG, THE BANKERS’ NEW CLOTHES: WHAT’S 
WRONG WITH BANKING AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2013). 
 2. John Crawford, Capital Accounts: Bank Capital, Crises, and the Determinants of an 
Optimal Regulatory Approach, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 1161, 1162–63 (2015) (citing academic reviews of 
Admati and Hellwig’s book). 
 3. E.g., Tom Braithwaite, Dimon Warns of Bank ‘Nail in Coffin’, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 31, 2011), 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/3157bcbe-5b05-11e0-a290-00144feab49a.html#axzz41m5ZgROX 
[https://perma.cc/W5YF-V88H]. 
 4. Peter Schroeder, Cruz, Kasich Spar on Bank Bailouts, THEHILL.COM,  (Nov. 10, 2015) 
http://thehill.com/policy/finance/259783-cruz-kasich-spar-on-bank-bailouts [https://perma.cc/37Z2-
SP62] (describing views of Ohio Governor John Kasich and former Florida Governor Jeb Bush); 
Mark Gimein, The 8 Weirdest Economic Ideas of the Republican Debate, TIME.COM (Nov. 11, 2015). 
http://time.com/money/4107879/republican-debate-milwaukee-fox-weird-economic-ideas/ 
[https://perma.cc/BLM3-HWNM]. 
 5. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner, How Do Bank Regulators Determine Capital-Adequacy 
Requirements?, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1853 (2015). 
 6. See, e.g., Julie Andersen Hill, Bank Capital Regulation by Enforcement: An Empirical 
Study, 87 IND. L.J. 645 (2012). 
 7. See, e.g., Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Top-Down Bank Capital Regulation, 55 WASHBURN 
L.J. 327 (2016); Brett H. McDonnell, The Promise and Perils of Top-Down Capital Regulation, 55 
WASHBURN L.J. 385 (2016). 
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the ways in which financial institutions game these legal rules.  The 
strategies financial institutions use to avoid capital requirements—
known collectively as regulatory capital arbitrage—merit closer study 
for at least two crucial reasons.8  First, regulatory capital arbitrage 
diminishes the effectiveness of bank capital rules.9  This is of great 
concern to the extent that bank capital regulation mitigates the 
externalities of bank failures on the broader economy.  Lower levels of 
capital and higher levels of leverage leave banks dangerously exposed to 
economic shocks.10  However, regulatory capital arbitrage may 
camouflage this risk and give the illusion that banks enjoy a significant 
capital buffer and can weather a financial storm.11  Indeed, some 
economists argue that regulatory capital arbitrage may have 
exacerbated the severity of the Global Financial Crisis of 2008.  
Prominent banks that had seemingly sufficient levels of capital 
nonetheless failed or required government lifelines.  The gaming of 
regulation meant that the effective leverage of these banks and their 
actual fragility may have been much higher than they appeared.12 
Second, regulatory capital arbitrage helps explain the evolution of 
bank capital rules.  Indeed, bank capital regulation has evolved in an 
almost lockstep dialectical manner with regulatory capital arbitrage.  
Each enactment by policymakers of new capital rules has engendered 
new strategies by financial institutions to game those rules.  This gives 
birth to a new generation of rules, as policymakers attempt to close 
loopholes and make bank capital rules more closely match the economic 
reality of bank balance sheets and bank risk-taking.13 
However, the form of bank regulations may never match exactly 
the substance of bank risk.  This stems in part from the 
“incompleteness” of legal rules.  Incompleteness provides a fancy term 
for describing how laws have jurisdictional boundaries (e.g., regulators 
in Italy have only limited application in Japan) and how the text of legal 
rules cannot cover every potential future state of the world and every 
possible behavioral reaction to those rules.14  Moreover, financial 
 
 8. For an early, influential, and prescient account of regulatory capital arbitrage, see David 
Jones, Emerging Problems with the Basel Capital Accord: Regulatory Capital Arbitrage and Related 
Issues, 24 J. BANKING & FIN. 35 (2000). 
 9. Id. at 37. 
 10. Schooner, supra note 7, at 330–31; ADMATI & HELLWIG, supra note 1. 
 11. Jones, supra note 8, at 36. 
 12. Infra Part V. 
 13. Infra Part III. 
 14. Katharina Pistor & Chenggang Xu, Incomplete Law, 35 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 931, 931 
(2003).  Pistor and Xu argue that incompleteness may take many forms.  Id. at 932–33.  Legal rules 
may be incomplete because they attempt to regulate comprehensively a set of activities but omit 
some substantively equivalent actions.  Id.  Other legal rules are incomplete because of vague or 
ambiguous language which leaves the boundaries of legal rules unclear.  Id.  Pistor and Xu describe 
how incompleteness can result not only from bad legislative drafting, but also because of 
GERDING (DO NOT DELETE) 5/2/2016  12:26 PM 
2016] The Dialectics of Bank Capital 359 
 
institutions have strong incentives to react to bank capital rules by 
devising new strategies of regulatory capital arbitrage.  If bank failures 
impose a negative externality on the economy, rules that attempt to 
internalize those costs on banks and their shareholders and managers 
may be inherently unstable.15 
This Article attempts to cast more light on regulatory capital 
arbitrage, by outlining why and how banks engage in regulatory capital 
arbitrage and briefly sketching out how capital regulation and 
regulatory capital arbitrage have evolved in dialectical fashion.  This 
Article concludes by describing and evaluating two broad approaches to 
dealing with the dynamic and unstable nature of capital rules (i.e. their 
constant erosion by regulatory capital arbitrage).  The first approach—
exemplified by the scholars like Anat Admati, Martin Hellwig,16 and, 
elsewhere in this Issue, Heidi Mandanis Schooner—is to enact simple, 
broad brush rules.  For Admati and Hellwig, this takes the form of much 
higher and blunter capital requirements.  Professor Schooner adds an 
additional nuance in her Article in this Issue.  She argues that 
policymakers should have a different baseline for capital regulations.  
Instead of incrementally increasing capital regulations over time, 
policymakers could have a presumption, anchored in the high finance of 
the Modigliani-Miller theorem,17 of high capital levels.  Regulators 
could then allow an individual bank to present evidence that its risk-
taking and probability of failure are low enough to justify lowering the 
capital requirement.18 
The second approach to addressing the recurring problem and 
evolving nature of regulatory capital arbitrage is to match complexity 
with complexity.  Policymakers could accept regulatory capital arbitrage 
and the constant evolution of financial institutions, markets, and 
investments, and in response, policymakers can dynamically adjust rules 
to reflect these realities.  That would require, however, that regulators 
possess the capacities and incentives both to track bank risk-taking and 
regulatory capital arbitrage and to adjust capital rules in a prompt and 
appropriate manner. 
Before launching into this Article, it may help to clarify some 
 
technological or social changes, or because legal drafters deliberately made legal rules ambiguous 
(whether for political reasons or to allow courts and agencies to fill in gaps).  Id. 
This account of incomplete legal rules has a mirror image in legal and economic scholarship on 
“incomplete” contracts.  See, e.g., Oliver Hart & John Moore, Foundations of Incomplete Contracts, 
66 REV. ECON. STUD. 115 (1999) (providing theoretical economic framework for analysis of 
incomplete contracts); Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An 
Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989). 
 15. See Jones, supra note 8, at 36. 
 16. ADMATI & HELLWIG, supra note 1. 
 17. See infra notes 37–38 and accompanying text (explaining the Modigliani-Miller theorem). 
 18. Schooner, supra note 7, at 329. 
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terminology.  Regulatory arbitrage as a general phenomenon has 
received increasing attention in legal scholarship.19  One might think of 
this term as simply a “high falutin’” label for how individuals or firms 
game or sidestep regulations.  However, it is helpful to see just how 
regulatory arbitrage strategies work in practice and how complex they 
can become.  It is also useful to think of regulatory arbitrage as two 
interconnected dynamics:20 
Investment switching.  In the face of regulatory restrictions that might 
lower or foreclose investment returns, investors and financial institutions 
divert to alternative channels for making investments or obtaining credit 
that are subject to lower regulatory taxes.  Investment switching often 
involves moving capital to parallel financial markets or other legal 
jurisdictions that offer close economic substitutes for a loan or investment 
but impose lower regulatory taxes.21 
Investment structuring.  Financial institutions or sophisticated investors 
also engage lawyers and other advisers (accountants, bankers, etc.) to 
develop legal structures to exploit the incompleteness of financial 
regulation.  Legal innovation provides these parties with regulatory 
“work-arounds.”  These legal structures creatively interpret legal 
definitions and exemptions to avoid the application of regulatory 
restrictions to a particular investment or source of credit.  Work-arounds 
allow market participants to enjoy the same economic benefits of a loan 
or investment at a lower regulatory “tax rate.”  Developing regulatory 
“work-arounds” for clients represents an essential role of transactional 
and regulatory attorneys, whom Professor Ronald Gilson famously called 
“transaction cost engineers.”  By lowering transaction costs, Gilson argues 
that lawyers facilitate the efficient pricing of assets.22 
These two techniques are by no means mutually exclusive.  Indeed, 
investment structuring—novel forms of transactions—often facilitates 
investment switching.  For example, in another financial regulatory 
context, American Depository Receipts (“ADRs”) are instruments that 
represent an interest in the securities of a non-U.S. company.  These 
ADRs trade on U.S. financial markets and enable U.S. investors to 
invest in foreign companies without having to purchase shares directly 
on a foreign exchange.23  Regulatory arbitrage is distinct from 
 
 19. See, e.g., Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REV. 227 (2010). 
 20. ERIK. F. GERDING, LAW, BUBBLES, AND FINANCIAL REGULATION 236–37 (2013). 
 21. Id. at 236–37 (describing investment switching); id. at 241–43 (describing factors that 
influence the decision by an individual or a firm to engage in investment switching). 
 22. Id. at 237 (describing investment structuring); id. at 243–46 (describing factors that influence 
the decision by an individual or a firm to engage in investment structuring).  See Ronald J. Gilson, 
Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239, 243 (1984).  
Gilson’s conclusion applies to transaction cost engineering, not regulatory arbitrage.  The arbitrage of 
a regulation only makes the pricing of an asset more efficient when that regulation is welfare 
reducing.  Undermining capital regulations that mitigate systemic risk might make capital rules less 
costly for firms, but more costly for society. 
 23. Brian P. Murray & Maurice Pesso, The Accident of Efficiency: Foreign Exchanges, 
American Depository Receipts, and Space Arbitrage, 51 BUFF. L. REV. 383, 389 (2003) (describing 
American Deposit Receipts (“ADRs”)).  Some economists have found that ADRs may enable 
financial arbitrage of foreign company securities, as arbitrageurs exploit price differences between a 
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deregulation.  The former is a decision by regulated firms or individuals 
to avoid regulation to lower their effective regulatory tax rate, while the 
latter is a choice by regulators to change the content or enforcement of 
legal rules also to lower the effective regulatory tax rate.24  Nonetheless, 
increased regulatory arbitrage and deregulation may create feedback 
effects for one another.25 
Regulatory capital arbitrage occurs when financial institutions or 
their investors engage in either investment switching or investment 
structuring to avoid or lower the effectiveness of regulatory capital 
requirements.  This translates into financial institutions having higher 
effective leverage or making riskier investments with the same amount 
of leverage.  As mentioned above, and as this Article further describes, 
regulatory capital arbitrage played a crucial role in leaving financial 
institutions more exposed to the subprime crisis and the larger Global 
Financial Crisis.26 
This Article proceeds as follows, Part II answers a fundamental 
question about regulatory capital arbitrage: why do banks seek to 
engage in it?  Part III sketches a high-level history of the development 
of bank capital regulations as an evolutionary/dialectical response to 
regulatory capital arbitrage.  Part IV examines how financial institutions 
engage in regulatory capital arbitrage, outlining some of the strategies, 
financial products, and transaction structures that financial institutions 
have used to sidestep the full brunt of these rules and to increase their 
leverage.  Part V summarizes some of the evidence of the extent that 
firms engaged in regulatory capital arbitrage in the years before the 
Financial Crisis of 2008 and the consequences of that gamesmanship 
during the Crisis.  Part VI frames the dialectics of capital regulation and 
regulatory capital arbitrage in terms of research into complex adaptive 
systems.  Part VI also describes how capital regulations may be 
inherently unstable, and it outlines the simple and high tech approaches 
to this instability and the challenge of regulatory capital arbitrage. 
 
company’s ADRs and equivalent amounts of its stock traded on foreign exchanges.  Mahmoud 
Wahab et al., Arbitrage Opportunities in the American Depository Receipts Market Revisited, 2 J. 
INT’L. FIN. MARKETS, INSTITUTIONS & MONEY 97 (1993). 
 24. Cf. GERDING, LAW, BUBBLES, AND FINANCIAL REGULATION, supra note 20, at 64 
(contrasting deregulation with “regulatory stimulus,” which describes a broader range or actions by 
government officials to promote investment or lending, including repealing or rolling back legal rules, 
granting exemptions or waivers from legal rules, changing legal interpretations, lowering 
enforcement, or other actions). 
 25. Erik F. Gerding, Deregulation Pas de Deux: Dual Regulatory Classes of Financial 
Institutions and the Path to Financial Crisis in Sweden and the United States, 15 NEXUS: CHAPMAN 
J.L. POL’Y 135 (2010). 
 26. See infra Part V. 
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II.  THE WHY OF REGULATORY CAPITAL ARBITRAGE 
A great deal of recent scholarship has looked at ways to reform 
capital rules.  Some of this has even noted the propensity of financial 
institutions to game and thus erode the effectiveness of bank capital 
regulations.  However, fewer scholars have asked the all-important 
question: why?  In other words, why are banks so intent on increasing 
their leverage and sidestepping rules that constrain that leverage?  
Furthermore, when regulations cap overall bank leverage, why do banks 
respond by making riskier investments? 
A.  Capital Requirements as Regulatory Tax 
To understand first why, and later how, banks engaged in this form 
of regulatory arbitrage, it is critical first to highlight the functions of 
capital regulations.  Regulatory capital requirements require that a 
financial institution retain a certain amount of equity based on the 
amount of assets it owns.27  The regulatory capital cushion has two 
interrelated functions.  First, it protects the bank from unexpected losses 
on its investments.28  Lowering the risk of bank insolvency mitigates the 
negative externalities of bank failures on financial markets, as well as on 
the firms and taxpayers who fund government guarantees of banks, 
explicit or implicit.29  Second, bank capital requirements reduce a firm’s 
leverage.30  Increased leverage of financial institutions not only leaves 
those firms more exposed to economic shocks and insolvency, it also can 
increase the effective supply of money in the economy and add fuel to 
asset price booms and bubbles.31 
When regulations require banks to maintain more capital than they 
would when subject solely to market discipline (i.e. the level of capital 
that their creditors and investors would demand), banks view these 
requirements as a form of regulatory taxation.32  As they do with respect 
to other forms of taxation, banks incur structuring costs to reduce the 
regulatory burden imposed by capital requirements.33  The goal of this 
 
 27. JEFF MADURA, FINANCIAL MARKETS AND INSTITUTIONS 492 (9th ed. 2010). 
 28. Id. 
 29. See Richard Herring & Til Schuermann, Capital Regulation for Position Risk in Banks, 
Securities Firms, and Insurance Companies, in CAPITAL ADEQUACY BEYOND BASEL: BANKING, 
SECURITIES, AND INSURANCE 15, 19  (Hal S. Scott ed., 2005) (describing rationale for capital 
adequacy rules of reducing systemic risk); STEPHANIE M. STULZ, BANK CAPITAL AND RISK-TAKING: 
THE IMPACT OF CAPITAL REGULATION, CHARTER VALUE, AND THE BUSINESS CYCLE 11 (2007) 
(describing literature on capital requirements mediating moral hazard of deposit insurance). 
 30. Viral V. Acharya et al., Capital, Contingent Capital, and Liquidity Requirements, in 
REGULATING WALL STREET: THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND THE NEW ARCHITECTURE OF GLOBAL 
FINANCE 143, 146–47 (Viral V. Acharya et al. eds., 2011) [hereinafter Acharya et al., Capital, 
Contingent Capital, and Liquidity Requirements]. 
 31. GERDING, LAW, BUBBLES, AND FINANCIAL REGULATION, supra note 20, at 366–68. 
 32. Jones, supra note 8, at 36. 
 33. Id. at 38–39. 
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arbitrage—called regulatory capital arbitrage—is to enable firms to 
reduce their capital ratios for regulatory purposes but without a 
corresponding reduction in economic risk (or to maintain regulatory 
capital ratios while increasing economic risk).34  Regulatory arbitrage 
may reduce a firm’s cost of capital and make more capital available to 
be deployed elsewhere.35 
B.  Cheap Debt: Government Guarantees, Systemic Risk, and the 
Instability of Regulatory Capital Requirements 
Financial institutions have tremendous incentives to game capital 
requirements and increase their leverage because of the relative 
inexpensiveness of debt to equity financing for them.36  Yet the 
cheapness of debt for financial institutions violates the Modigliani-
Miller theorem on corporate finance.  This theory holds that, under 
certain assumptions, a firm should have the same cost of financing 
whether it finances itself entirely through equity, entirely through debt, 
or with any mix of the two.37  Several factors may explain why debt is 
cheaper than equity for financial institutions.38  The tax-deductibility of 
interest payments on debt creates one distortion.39 
Government guarantees of financial institutions—whether explicit 
or implicit—provide another powerful force that makes debt cheaper 
than equity.  By offering to bail out financial institution creditors, these 
guarantees make debt relatively cheap.  Like black holes, guarantees 
exert a powerful gravitational pull towards leverage that warps 
regulatory and market space.  Financial institutions have powerful 
incentives to exploit these guarantees and arbitrage capital 
requirements.40 
Attempting to remove these guarantees may not provide a realistic 
 
 34. See id. at 36, 38–39. 
 35. Id. at 38–40. 
 36. Acharya et al., supra note 30, at 157. 
 37. Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the 
Theory of Investment, 48 AM. ECON. REV. 261 (1958). 
 38. For a comprehensive analysis of when the assumptions of the Modigliani-Miller theorem do 
not hold, see Peter H. Huang & Michael S. Knoll, Corporate Finance, Corporate Law and Finance 
Theory, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 175, 177–80 (2000) (presenting the “reverse” Modigliani-Miller theorem). 
 39. Tax Reform and the Tax Treatment of Debt and Equity, Joint Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on Fin. & H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 112th Cong. 6 (July 13, 2011) (statement of Victor 
Fleischer, Assoc. Professor, U. Colo. L. Sch.) 
http://finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Fleischer%20Testimony.pdf [https://perma.cc/7XED-
X6TC].  Professor Fleischer cites the use of hybrid instruments, such as trust preferred, as evidence 
that the asymmetrical tax treatment of debt and equity induces leverage.  Id. at 9.  These hybrid 
instruments are discussed below.  See infra notes 60–62 and accompanying text. 
 40. See Acharya et al., supra note 30, at 157; Allen N. Berger et al., The Role of Capital in 
Financial Institutions, 19 J. BANKING & FIN. 393 (1995).  See also Robert C. Merton & Zvi Bodie, On 
the Management of Financial Guarantees, 21 FIN. MGMT. 87, 95–96 (1992) (discussing limitations of 
capital requirements as means that guarantor can govern the debtor). 
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remedy.  Governments provide these guarantees to mitigate systemic 
risk and to lower the cost of bank failures that are externalized on 
financial markets.41  Policymakers cannot credibly forswear government 
guarantees and bailouts altogether because of these potential systemic 
externalities of bank failures.42  These externalities and the prospect of 
government bailouts make financial regulation inherently unstable 
because of moral hazard (which, because of the Financial Crisis and 
government bailouts, is a concept many taxpayers now understand all 
too well).43  Indeed, governments impose capital requirements to 
mitigate the moral hazard of financial institutions taking excessive risk 
at the ultimate expense of taxpayers.44  However, the prospect of 
government guarantees rescuing creditors of financial institutions makes 
debt relatively cheap and creates powerful incentives for financial 
institutions to game these capital requirements and increase leverage. 
Financial institution leverage has effects beyond moral hazard.  
This leverage feeds asset price bubbles by increasing the effective 
money supply.  Rising prices can cover up market mispricing of risk.  
Leverage also leaves individual financial institutions and entire financial 
markets more susceptible to economic downturns.45 
Implicit government guarantees can become self-fulfilling 
prophecies.  The widespread belief in the marketplace that the 
government will bail out the creditors of a financial institution will lead 
creditors to over-lend to that institution.  If the level of lending becomes 
large enough, the risk of the institution failing may threaten the stability 
of financial markets generally.  This creates strong pressure on the 
government to provide an actual bailout.  The same logic applies to 
lending to entire classes of financial institutions.  If creditors think the 
government will guarantee an entire class of institutions, lending to that 
class will increase.  The government may not see an economically, 
politically, or legally principled way to bail out some institutions in the 
class but not others.46 
 
 41. See id.; see also Viral Acharya & Matthew Richardson, Causes of the Financial Crisis, 21 
CRIT. REV. 195, 197–98 (2009). 
 42. Acharya et al., supra note 30, at 157. 
 43. See Matthew Richardson, Large Banks and the Volcker Rule, in REGULATING WALL 
STREET, supra note 30, at 181, 184. 
 44. See Herring & Schuermann, supra note 29, at 19 (describing rationale for capital adequacy 
rules of reducing systemic risk); STULZ, supra note 29, at 11 (describing literature on capital 
requirements mediating moral hazard of deposit insurance). 
 45. GERDING, LAW, BUBBLES AND FINANCIAL REGULATION, supra note 20, at 383–85. 
 46. Id. at 324–26. 
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III.  HISTORICAL DIALECTICS: THE BASEL ACCORDS AND 
REGULATORY CAPITAL ARBITRAGE 
This primal impulse of financial institutions to escape capital 
requirements shaped the development of international and national 
banking regulation.  A brief history of the Basel Accords, a set of 
international agreements among bank regulators, reveals that capital 
regulations and regulatory capital arbitrage co-evolved in a dialectical 
manner.47  The evolution of capital requirements provides a prime 
example of a “regulatory dialectic” described by Edward Kane in 1986.  
Kane argued that financial innovation responds to regulator actions; 
regulators, in turn, adjust regulations in light of financial innovation.48 
In the 1980s, bank regulators in several nations (members of the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision) became concerned about the 
prospect of an international race-to-the-bottom in regulatory capital 
requirements for banks.  The regulators feared banks in countries with 
lower capital regulations would gain a competitive advantage and would 
attract cross-border capital flows.  In other words, regulators worried 
about the effects of massive investment switching on bank regulation, 
bank stability, and the risk of cross-border financial crises.  These 
concerns animated the creation of the Basel I Accord.49 
In 1988, bank regulators in various countries agreed to set 
recommended minimum capital requirements for banks in their 
jurisdictions that were ultimately adopted by the G-10 countries.50  
 
 47. Basel I and II are accords among bank regulators and central bankers from countries that 
belong to the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (members come from the so-called “Group 
of Ten” countries: Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States).  Each Accord consists of a series of 
recommended bank regulations and principles that national regulators should implement in their 
home countries.  Each Accord thus attempts to set minimum international banking standards to 
mitigate both regulatory arbitrage by international banks and the financial risks caused by bank 
failure that could spread from one economy to another.  For capsule summaries of the Basel 
Accords, see generally Robert F. Hugi et al., U.S. Adoption of Basel II and the Basel II 
Securitization Framework, 12 N.C. BANKING INST. 45 (2008); Eric Y. Wu, Basel II: A Revised 
Framework, 24 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 150 (2005). 
  Although non-binding, national regulators exert pressure on one another to comply with the 
Accord, giving it the quality of “soft law.”  See Michael S. Barr & Geoffrey P. Miller, Global 
Administrative Law: The View from Basel, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 15, 17 (2006) (reciting critiques of law-
making by networks of bank regulators and international bureaucrats in the Basel Accord, including 
that the process lacks accountability and legitimacy, but arguing that Basel II is subject to a subtle 
structure of international administrative law); Dieter Kerwer, Rules that Many Use: Standards and 
Global Regulation, 18 GOVERNANCE 611 (2005). 
 48. Edward J. Kane, Technology and the Regulation of Financial Markets, in TECHNOLOGY 
AND THE REGULATION OF FINANCIAL MARKETS: SECURITIES, FUTURES AND BANKING 187 
(Anthony Saunders & Lawrence J. White eds. 1986). 
 49. For historical background on adoption of the original Basel Accord, see Joseph Jude 
Norton, Capital Adequacy Standards: A Legitimate Regulatory Concern for Prudential Supervision 
of Banking Activities?, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1299, 1336–42 (1989).  See also JONATHAN R. MACEY ET 
AL., BANKING LAW AND REGULATION 281–82 (3d ed. 2001) (discussing history of U.S. risk-based 
capital standards leading to Basel I). 
 50. CHARLES GOODHART, THE BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION: A HISTORY OF 
THE EARLY YEARS 1974–1997 170, 180–81, 190–91 (2011) (detailing history of adoption of Basel I). 
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Basel I established regulatory capital requirements for the credit risk 
exposure of banks.51  The Basel I rules required that certain large banks 
maintain capital equal to 8% of the value of their risk-weighted assets.52 
The framers of the first Basel Accord also came to fear that banks 
would game simple leverage caps by stuffing riskier assets into their 
balance sheets.  Banks would meet the leverage cap, but their risk of 
failure would be much higher.  The drafters recognized that not all 
assets posed equal credit risk, and created different regulatory 
categories (or “buckets”) for assets based on their perceived credit risk.  
Assets that posed minimal credit risk required zero capital.  On the 
other end of the spectrum, higher credit risk assets required 100% 
capital.53 
This crude approach of placing assets into risk buckets created 
problems.  The regulatory risk weights did not match the true economic 
risk that assets posed for banks.  In many cases, the actual credit risk 
was lower than the risk reflected in the regulatory weight, which created 
strong incentives for banks to engage in regulatory capital arbitrage 
(including through the techniques described below in Part IV).54 
To remedy the failings of Basel I, the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision drafted the Basel II Accord.55  This second agreement 
supplemented the Basel I Accord (the risk-bucket approach was 
tweaked, but remains in place for many banks) and allowed certain 
large banks to set their capital requirements according to the bank’s 
own proprietary risk models.  The Accord’s drafters created this policy 
innovation on the theory that these models would better reflect the true 
economic risk faced by large banks.  Theoretically, the freedom to set 
risk capital according to their own models would not only enable banks 
to deploy capital more efficiently, it would also curb their incentives to 
engage in regulatory capital arbitrage.56 
 
 51. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL 
MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS (1998), 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsc111.pdf?noframes=1 [https://perma.cc/AT3D-MV96] [hereinafter 
BASEL I]. 
 52. Id. at 13. 
 53. Id. at 7–8 (establishing risk weight system). 
 54. Raj Bhala, Applying Equilibrium Theory and the FICAS Model: A Case Study of Capital 
Adequacy and Currency Trading, 41 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 125, 159–62, 178, 183–87 (1997) (detailing 
arguments for superiority of banks’ internal models to measure risk and set capital requirements 
compared to regulatory methods). 
 55. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL 
MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS: A REVISED FRAMEWORK COMPREHENSIVE VERSION 
(2006), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs128.pdf [https://perma.cc/F5UP-PSS5] [hereinafter BASEL II].  
Basel II allowed certain large banks to use proprietary risk models to set their capital requirements 
for not only credit risk, id. at 59–60, but market risk, id. at 191–203, and operational risk, id. at 147, as 
well. 
 56. See Joseph J. Norton, A Perceived Trend in Modern International Financial Regulation: 
Increasing Reliance on a Public-Private Partnership, 37 INT’L LAW 43, 53–58 (2003) (discussing 
mechanics and rationale for Basel II).  See also Bhala, supra note 54 (providing arguments for use of 
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However, as we will see, banks and other financial institutions 
found ways to game these rules and used the internal-model approach to 
increase their leverage dramatically.57  In December 2010, the Basel 
Committee responded to the flaws in Basel II, which were exposed by 
the Panic of 2007–2008 with a third accord, Basel III.58  Basel III ramps 
up the complexity of capital requirements by requiring that banks 
maintain capital against a wider range of risks (e.g., liquidity risk) and 
by setting intricate, even convoluted formulae for calculating those 
separate capital cushions.  Time will tell how banks will arbitrage this 
third Basel incarnation. 
IV.  THE “HOW” OF REGULATORY CAPITAL ARBITRAGE 
A.  Financial Instruments as Tools of Regulatory Capital Arbitrage 
Banks and other financial institutions game the types of capital 
requirements envisioned by Basel I and II in a number of ways.  The 
most important forms of regulatory capital arbitrage have involved 
various types of investment structuring facilitated by securitization and 
derivatives.59 
Regulatory capital arbitrage generally entails banks gaming 
traditional bank capital ratios by playing with the numerator and 
denominator of those ratios.60  Simple regulatory capital requirements 
mandate that financial institutions maintain a capital ratio comprised of 
equity in the numerator and assets in the denominator.61  The Basel I 
and Basel II accords contained complex rules for what types of equity 
instruments could count towards the numerator.62  As noted above, the 
Accords also required different ratios of capital for different categories 
of assets in the denominator, depending on the believed riskiness of the 
assets.63 
Banks could game these traditional capital rules by cosmetically 
 
internal models approach). 
 57. Infra Part IV.B; Erik F. Gerding, Code, Crash, and Open Source: The Outsourcing of 
Financial Regulation to Risk Models and the Global Financial Crisis, 84 WASH. L. REV. 127, 159, 
180–82 (2009) [hereinafter Gerding, Code, Crash, and Open Source]. 
 58. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BASEL III: A GLOBAL REGULATORY 
FRAMEWORK FOR MORE RESILIENT BANKS AND BANKING SYSTEMS (2010) 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189_dec2010.pdf https://perma.cc/LZQ5-4LLX]. 
 59. Some senior regulators recognized this potential and expressed concern as early as 1998.  
E.g., Laurence H. Meyer, Governor, Fin. Globalization & Efficient Banking Regulation, Remarks at 
the Annual Washington Conference of the Institute of International Bankers (Mar. 2, 1998). 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/1998/19980302.htm [https://perma.cc/9VLV-
KGGK]. 
 60. Jones, supra note 8, at 36. 
 61. MADURA, supra note 27, at 429. 
 62. See Benton E. Gup, Capital Games, in CAPITAL MARKETS, GLOBALIZATION, AND 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 17 (Benton E. Gup ed., 2005). 
 63. Id. 
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increasing the numerator in the ratio— for example, through gains 
trading or under-provisioning for loan loss reserves.64  Banks also 
gamed the numerator by developing hybrid securities, such as trust 
preferred securities.  These securities are treated like debt for tax 
purposes (with interest payments being subject to tax deductions), but 
as capital for bank regulatory purposes.65  Trust preferred securities had 
debt-like features, including required “interest” payments to holders 
(with some ability of the bank to defer payments for limited time 
periods).66  Commentators have faulted the performance of these 
instruments during the Financial Crisis.  The responsibility of banks to 
make “debt payments” combined with a freeze in the market for 
issuances of trust preferred securities during the Crisis underscored that 
these securities did not provide the same cushion against losses as plain 
vanilla equity.67 
The games that banks have played with the numerator of 
regulatory capital ratios pale in comparison to the prevalence and 
complexity of their strategies to manipulate the denominator.68  
Securitization has played a vital role in these efforts.69  In a 
securitization transaction, an investment vehicle purchases and pools 
together various loans or other assets that have predictable future cash 
streams provided by the underlying assets.  Those cash streams 
collateralize and fund securities that the vehicle issues to investors in 
capital markets.  The investment vehicle typically issues different classes 
(or tranches) of securities, with senior classes having prior contractual 
claims on the cash streams.  The tranches thus offer investors different 
mixes of risk and reward.70 
Securitization has evolved into numerous specialized variants, 
including asset-backed commercial paper.  Companies seeking financing 
create asset-backed commercial paper by first selling cash-producing 
assets into an investment vehicle.  The investment vehicle then issues 
 
 64. Id. 
 65. See Acharya et al., supra note 30, at 161, 175. 
 66. Id. at 161.  Trust preferred securities were in turn securitized to develop more liquid 
markets for these securities.  Id. 
 67. Id. at 161, 176–77.  The Dodd-Frank Act restricts the use of trust preferred securities for 
meeting regulatory capital purposes.  Id. at 176–77. 
 68. Jones, supra note 8, at 36. 
 69. Id. 
 70. For a description of the mechanics and economic benefits of securitization, see Gerding, 
Code, Crash, and Open Source, supra note 57, at 147–49; Anand K. Bhattacharya & Frank J. 
Fabozzi, Expanding Frontiers of Asset Securitization, in ASSET-BACKED SECURITIES 1 (Anand K. 
Bhattacharya & Frank J. Fabozzi eds., 1996); Leon T. Kendall, Securitization: A New Era in 
American Finance, in A PRIMER ON SECURITIZATION 1–8 (Leon T. Kendall & Michael J. Fishman 
eds., 1997); Steven P. Baum, The Securitization of Commercial Property Debt, in A PRIMER ON 
SECURITIZATION 45; Joshua Coval et al., The Economics of Structured Finance, 23 J. ECON. PERSP. 3 
(2009). 
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short term securities with maturities of between 90 and 180 days.71  
Aside from issuing securities with shorter maturities, asset-backed 
commercial paper differs from traditional securitization in several other 
respects.  First, the investment vehicle in asset-backed commercial 
paper, called a “conduit,” may purchase a revolving set of assets that 
may change over time.72  Second, as commercial paper matures, the 
conduit will issue new paper to investors, the proceeds of which will be 
used to purchase fresh assets and pay the fees of the various service 
providers to the transaction.73  These first two features mean that 
conduits may suffer an asset-liability mismatch, as they have short-term 
obligations to investors, yet hold longer-term assets.  This mismatch 
potential leads to a third feature of asset-backed commercial paper  that 
differs from traditional securitizations: in exchange for a fee, a third 
party often agrees to provide liquidity support to the vehicle in the form 
of infusions of cash or liquid assets as needed.74  Like securitizations, 
asset-backed commercial paper issuances often include credit support 
(in the form of bond insurance, credit derivatives, or other financial 
guarantees) from another financial institution.75 
Securitization, in whatever form, offers the lenders who sell assets 
to an investment vehicle for cash a way to solve a mismatch between 
long-term assets and short-term liabilities.  It affords investors the 
ability to participate in lending markets with securities that 
(theoretically) can be more liquid than loans themselves and that are 
tailored to particular investment needs.  More generally, securitization 
provides a mechanism to transfer and spread credit risk from lenders to 
investors.76 
Yet securitization has also been a valuable tool in gaming 
regulations.  This latter role may have eclipsed its other economic 
benefits.  The use of securitization in regulatory capital arbitrage may be 
understood through two insights.  First, securitization can game the fact 
that traditional capital regulations place assets in certain risk buckets.  
By unbundling and reassembling the cash streams and risk from 
underlying assets, securitization allows firms to create tranches of 
instruments that qualify for a particular regulatory bucket.  Yet these 
financial firms can then secretly “stuff” more economic risk into a 
 
 71. Viral V. Acharya & Matthew Richardson, Causes of the Financial Crisis, 21 CRIT. REV. 195, 
201 (2009). 
 72. FITCH RATINGS, ASSET-BACKED COMMERCIAL PAPER EXPLAINED 1 (2001). 
http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~igiddy/ABS/fitchabcp.pdf [https://perma.cc/6XYW-PD5K]. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Viral V. Acharya et al., Securitization Without Risk Transfer 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research Working Paper No. 15730, 2010). 
 75. In addition, some conduits purchase a mix of different assets to diversify the portfolio.  
FITCH RATINGS, supra note 72. 
 76. Gerding, Code, Crash, and Open Source, supra note 57, at 148–49. 
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particular tranche than regulators assumed when they created the risk 
weight for that bucket.77 
Second, securitization plays with the regulatory treatment of 
guarantees.  David Jones explains this using the following example.  
Assume a firm has a balance sheet with assets of $100 in loans, liabilities 
of $95 in deposits, and $5 in equity.  This firm’s implied leverage ratio is 
thus 5%.  If a firm were to sell $50 in loans to a third party and provide 
an off-balance sheet guarantee for those loans (for example, through a 
standby letter of credit or other form of credit enhancement), it would 
have the same economic risk.  Yet its capital ratio per its balance sheet 
would dramatically improve, jumping to 10% ($5 in equity divided by 
$50 in on-balance sheet loans).78  The first two Basel Accords prohibit 
this simple form of regulatory capital arbitrage by imposing regulatory 
capital requirements on financial guarantees.  The Accords require that 
when the bank issues a guarantee on assets that it has sold itself, the 
guarantee is deemed to be “recourse.”  This generally means that the 
bank must maintain capital equal to the bank’s maximum potential 
credit loss under the guarantee.  Nevertheless, banks use securitization 
and other shadow banking instruments to create effective guarantees 
that do not require that the financial institution maintain regulatory 
capital for the full amount of economic risk the banks retain.79 
B.  Six Strategies for Regulatory Capital Arbitrage 
These two insights—the capacity of securitization to manipulate 
regulatory risk buckets and the creative use of guarantees—help explain 
six common strategies for regulatory capital arbitrage: 
1.  Concentrating Credit Risk and Cherry Picking 
Under the first strategy, banks structure asset-backed securities so 
that subordinated tranches of asset-backed securities bear high 
concentrations of economic risk (that is, they are more at risk for loss 
should the loans that back the securitization default).  Yet, these junior 
tranches of asset-backed securities are subject to low relatively low 
regulatory capital requirements; in other words, the capital that a bank 
must maintain against these securities according to regulation is lower 
than appropriate given the true economic risk of those securities.  The 
senior tranches in the securitization contain a correspondingly low 
degree of economic risk, but would require relatively higher capital; 
 
 77. Jones, supra note 8, at 41–44. 
 78. Id. at 40. 
 79. Id. at 40–42. 
GERDING (DO NOT DELETE) 5/2/2016  12:26 PM 
2016] The Dialectics of Bank Capital 371 
 
they would bear the brunt of the regulatory capital requirements.  The 
issuing bank then retains the subordinated securities and sells the senior 
securities to outside investors.80 
Scholars have also claimed that banks used the flip side of the same 
strategy: banks would securitize assets and then purchase the resultant 
AAA-rated senior securities.  These securities would contain more 
economic risk than assumed by the regulatory capital requirements.81  
These AAA-rated securities were treated as having minimal credit risk 
and no liquidity or funding risk.82  Banks could thus have their cake 
(enjoy fat premiums on their asset-backed security investments, which 
were particularly high for securitizations backed by subprime 
mortgages) and eat it too (lower their regulatory capital below 
economic risk).83 
2.  Remote Origination 
The second strategy is to ensure “remote origination,” namely that 
the issuer of the asset-backed securities is not affiliated with the original 
lender that made the underlying loans.  Securitizations involve remote 
originators for many reasons (primarily bankruptcy).84  However, bank 
regulations provide another reason; capital regulations historically 
required only an 8% capital ratio if the bank issued a guarantee of loans 
owned by someone else.  This provides an explanation for one structural 
feature of some asset-backed commercial paper programs: the credit 
enhancements provided by the sponsoring bank require lower capital 
when some other entity (other than the sponsoring bank) originates the 
assets that will back the commercial paper sold to investors.85 
Remote origination also had benefits for the lenders.  By selling 
loans into a securitization, these lenders were able to move those assets 
off their balance sheets.  The lenders could then hold little or no capital 
against those assets on the theory that they bore minimal risk for those 
assets.  However, the Financial Crisis and the collapse of investor 
demand for mortgage-backed securities revealed that originating 
 
 80. Id. at 42–44. 
 81. Acharya et al., Capital, Contingent Capital, and Liquidity Requirements, supra note 30, at 
149. 
 82. Id. at 148. 
 83. Acharya & Richardson, supra note 71, at 204–05. 
 84. If the originator is deemed to have made a “true sale” of the assets to the structured 
investment vehicle, the assets are no longer considered part of the estate of the originator in 
bankruptcy.  The structured investment vehicle  is then the outright owner of the mortgages or other 
assets, and the originator no longer has any impact on the risk being transferred from borrowers to 
the structured investment vehicle and investors.  Originating lenders would often transfer assets to 
securitization vehicles via one or more intermediate trusts to further ensure bankruptcy remoteness.  
For a discussion of “true sales” in securitizations, see Steven L. Schwarcz, Securitization Post-Enron, 
25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1539, 1543–48 (2004). 
 85. Jones, supra note 8, at 44–45. 
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lenders in fact continued to bear substantial risk even for assets they 
sold.86  Originating banks (and other mortgage lenders) were subject to 
warehouse risk, i.e., the risk of being unable to sell mortgages they 
originated and offload the credit, liquidity, and interest rate risk 
associated with those loans.87 
Moreover, even when banks successfully sold loans into a 
securitization, they may also have had recourse obligations for those 
assets.88  Although accounting and bank regulatory capital standards 
may have treated the likelihood of these obligations being triggered as 
remote, these obligations caused significant losses for banks and other 
financial institutions.89  Indeed, large financial institutions that sold 
mortgages into securitizations have agreed to settlements totaling 
billions of dollars because those mortgages violated representations and 
warranties about mortgage quality and underwriting standards.  This 
massive recourse liability meant that a significant amount of risk that 
banks moved off their balance sheet in securitizations eventually 
rematerialized on their financial statements.90 
3.  Indirect Credit Enhancements and Creative Guarantees 
The third strategy exploits the regulatory treatment of other forms 
of economic guarantees provided by banks for securitization vehicles.  
In essence, these guarantors bear more economic risk than suggested by 
the regulatory capital required.91 
For example, banks carefully structured the liquidity enhancements 
that they provided to asset-backed commercial paper vehicles to obtain 
lower risk weights for these guarantees under capital regulations.92  
 
 86. Erik F. Gerding, Bank Regulation and Securitization: How the Law Improved Transmission 
Lines Between Real Estate and Banking Crises, 50 GA. L. REV. 89, 116 (2015).  See FIN. CRISIS 
INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 74 (2011) (explaining how mortgage 
originators were adversely affected when investor demand for “risky assets” sharply declined).  
 87. Gerding, supra note 86, at 116; Adrian D’Silva & Brian Gordon, Hedges in the Warehouse: 
The Banks Get Trimmed, (Fed. Reserve Bank of Chi. Fin. Mkts. Grp., Policy Discussion Paper, No. 
2008-5, 2008), available at 
http://www.chicagofed.org/digital_assets/publications/policy_discussion_papers/ 2008/PDP2008-5.pdf. 
 88. Gerding, supra note 86, at 116; Erik F. Gerding, The Shadow Banking System and Its Legal 
Origins 42 (Aug. 23, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (explaining the imposition 
of regulatory capital requirements) available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1990816 (giving an example of when a bank may 
be exposed to a recourse obligation).  Securitization sponsors may also have obligations to warehouse 
lenders.  See  
Richard Stanton, Johan Walden & Nancy Wallace, The Industrial Organization of the US 
Residential Mortgage Market, 6 ANN. REV. FIN. ECON. 259, 271 (2014) (relating New Century’s 
inability to pay the margin calls made by its warehouse lenders). 
 89. Gerding, supra note 86, at 116. See Stanton, Walden & Wallace, supra note 88, at 271 
(discussing New Century’s inability to satisfy its obligations).  
 90.   Gerding, supra note 86, at 116.  See e.g., Andrew Grossman & Christina Rexrode, 
Citigroup to Pay $7 Billion in Mortgage Probe, WALL ST. J. (July 14, 2014).  
 91. Id. at 45–46. 
 92. Id.; see also Acharya et al., Securitization Without Risk Transfer, supra note 74; Acharya et 
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Careful structuring allowed banks that provided liquidity enhancements 
to maintain only 0.8% capital against the value of assets in the asset-
backed commercial paper vehicle (compared to the 8% capital that 
would be required had these assets been on the bank’s balance sheet).93  
On the assumption that there was minimal risk that these guarantees 
would be triggered, U.S. bank regulators effectively exempted these 
liquidity enhancements from capital requirements for the sponsoring 
banks.94  The asset-backed commercial paper market responded with 
explosive growth.  It doubled from $600 billion outstanding in 2004 to 
$1.2 trillion outstanding as of the second quarter of 2007.95 
The market freeze during the Financial Crisis triggered these 
liquidity guarantees and revealed the mistake of this light regulatory 
capital treatment.96  Asset-backed commercial paper transactions were 
structured so that, when the crisis struck, investors bore only 4.3% of 
the loss of the $1.25 trillion outstanding in asset-backed commercial 
paper.  Guarantors bore the remainder.97 Empirical studies show when 
asset-backed commercial paper investment vehicles suffered losses 
during the Crisis, sponsoring banks—and not investors—generally bore 
the losses.98  Risk materialized on the balance sheets of sponsoring 
banks despite the light capital treatment.99  This led several scholars to 
brand asset-backed commercial paper as “securitization without risk 
transfer” and to conclude that a primary driver of these securitization 
structures was regulatory capital arbitrage.100 
In addition to liquidity enhancements, banks designed other 
creative, indirect guarantees.  For example, banks designed complex 
credit enhancements for those securitizations that resembled revolving 
credit facilities, such as collateralized loan agreements (a form of 
collateralized debt obligation (“CDO”)) and securitizations of credit 
card receivables.101  Careful structuring meant that these credit 
 
al., Capital, Contingent Capital, and Liquidity Requirements, supra note 30, at 148. 
 93. Viral V. Acharya & Phillip Schnabl, Do Global Banks Spread Global Imbalances?  Asset-
Backed Commercial Paper During the Financial Crisis of 2007-09, 58 IMF ECON. REV. 37, 50 (2010). 
 94. Acharya et al., Securitization Without Risk Transfer, supra note 74, at 12. 
 95. See Acharya et al., Capital, Contingent Capital, and Liquidity Requirements, supra note 30, 
at 148–49. 
 96. Acharya et al., Securitization Without Risk Transfer, supra note 74; Acharya et al., Capital, 
Contingent Capital, and Liquidity Requirements, supra note 30, at 148. 
 97. See Acharya et al., Capital, Contingent Capital, and Liquidity Requirements, supra note 30, 
at 149. 
 98. Acharya & Schnabl, supra note 93, at 61–63. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Acharya et al., Securitization Without Risk Transfer, supra note 74, at 31–34. 
 101. Jones, supra note 8, at 46.  The assets backing these securitizations may be paid off 
(“drawdowns”) by borrowers quickly, yet investors purchasing the asset-backed securities may prefer 
a much longer maturity on their securities.  Id.  Banks sponsoring these securitizations covered any 
potential resulting mismatches between an investment vehicle’s fluctuating assets and its issued 
securities by creating “master trusts.”  Id. at 46–47.  Under these trusts, the bank “designates” lines of 
credit for the investment vehicle.  Id. at 46–47.  
GERDING (DO NOT DELETE) 5/2/2016  12:26 PM 
374 Washburn Law Journal [Vol. 55 
 
enhancements required no or minimal regulatory capital for the banks 
that provided them.102 
Still other guarantees from banks and financial institutions were 
implicit.  Although many sponsors of securitizations had no contractual 
obligation to support a failing investment vehicle, the marketplace 
expected that the firm would step in should the vehicle experience 
extreme losses.103  A financial institution that failed to honor these 
expectations might suffer a severe reputation loss and be unable to find 
financing in the future.104  Scholars have found that, to avoid this fate, 
sponsors would go to great lengths to support investment vehicles.105   If 
sponsors of securitization could provide “moral recourse” for these 
vehicles without agreeing explicitly and contractually to provide a 
guarantee, they could avoid capital requirements and other legal 
costs.106 
4.  Third-Party Guarantees 
Banks also engaged in regulatory capital arbitrage when they 
purchased asset-backed securities that enjoyed third-party guarantees 
via credit derivatives or bond insurance.  Those guarantees allowed the 
banks that invested in senior asset-backed securities to maintain as little 
as zero capital against those investments.  Regulations allowed banks to 
maintain no capital even though capital markets priced the credit risk on 
those assets (when adjusted for the guarantees) at more than zero.  
Banks widely exploited this loophole.  For example, AIG’s 2007 Annual 
Report disclosed that $379 billion of its $527 billion credit derivative 
exposure (created by its infamous Financial Products Group) 
represented derivatives sold to financial institutions seeking to engage in 
this form of regulatory capital arbitrage.107 
 
 102. The sponsoring bank’s credit exposure under these lines of credit was considered minimal.  
Id.  Thus, a bank’s credit enhancement was considered to constitute not credit risk (which would 
require regulatory capital under Basel), but operational risk (which would not require regulatory 
capital).  Id. 
 103. Gary B. Gorton & Nicholas S. Souleles, Special Purpose Vehicles and Securitization, in THE 
RISKS OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 549, 551–52 (Mark Carey & René M. Stulz eds. 2007).  Gorton 
and Souleles provide a model for implicit recourse.  Id. at 575–78.  The model explains how “[t]he 
sponsoring bank and the investors in the SPV collude in adopting a contractual mechanism that 
cannot be written down because of accounting and regulatory rules.”  Id. at 576. 
 104. Id.  As financial institutions judged that the probability of this non-contractual liability was 
low, they decided that they did not need to treat these moral recourse obligations as a balance sheet 
liability.  Stephen G. Ryan, Accounting in and for the Subprime Crisis, 83 ACCT. REV. 1605, 1632 
(2008). 
 105. Gorton & Souleles, supra note 103, at 565 (surveying others studies finding moral recourse), 
580–87 (testing for and finding evidence of marketplace assumption of moral recourse by 
securitization sponsors). 
 106. See generally id. (discussing how regulators recognized the problem of moral recourse, but 
providing tests that show sponsors of securitizations nonetheless appear to have provided non-
contractual guarantees). 
 107. Acharya et al., Capital, Contingent Capital, and Liquidity Requirements, supra note 30, at 
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5.  Moving Assets from Banking Book to Trading Book 
The 1997 Market Risk Amendment to the Basel Accords facilitated 
additional forms of regulatory capital arbitrage.  These amendments 
allowed certain banks to set regulatory capital for certain risks in their 
trading books.  This encouraged banks to move asset-backed securities 
and other shadow banking instruments from their banking books to 
their trading books to lower their regulatory capital dramatically.108 
6.  Exploiting Basel II’s Do-it-Yourself Capital Requirements 
As noted above, the Basel II Accord allowed certain large financial 
institutions to set their own regulatory capital levels according to their 
proprietary risk models.  When the Securities and Exchange 
Commission extended this approach to certain large investment banking 
conglomerates, many of those firms dramatically increased their 
leverage ratios to over 30:1 within a three-year span.109  In other words, 
financial institutions used these models to lower their capital 
requirements.110  Financial institutions used these same models to 
measure firm risk management policies and price asset-backed 
securities, credit derivatives, and other shadow banking instruments.111 
C.  Regulatory Capital Arbitrage as Compound Arbitrage; Rating 
Agencies 
Many of the six evasion strategies described above depended on 
asset-backed securities or other shadow banking instruments and 
counterparties receiving investment grade ratings from credit rating 
agencies.112  Financial institutions played a different set of games to 
achieve higher ratings.  For example, scholars have examined how the 
financial institutions that designed and marketed asset-backed securities 
shopped among rating agency firms for higher ratings.  The firms that 
put together securitizations determined which ratings firm would get 
hired for a particular transaction.  Competition among ratings firms, 
combined with negligible liability for giving unwarranted investment 
grade ratings, created perverse incentives for the agencies to please the 
firms holding the purse strings.113 
 
149–50. 
 108. Jones, supra note 8, at 48; see also Robert P. Bartlett, III, Making Banks Transparent, 65 
VAND. L. REV. 293 (2012). 
 109. See Gerding, Code, Crash, and Open Source, supra note 57, at 159 (citing Stephen Labaton, 
Agency’s ‘04 Rule Let Banks Pile Up New Debt, and Risk, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2008, at A1). 
 110. See Gerding, Code, Crash, and Open Source, supra note 57, at 154–59.  
 111. Id. at 139–43, 147–64. 
 112. Acharya & Schnabl, supra note 93, at 85. 
 113. Edward I. Altman et al., Regulation of Rating Agencies, in REGULATING WALL STREET, 
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The gaming of rating agencies may have taken even more 
sophisticated forms.  In the wake of the SEC’s 2010 lawsuit against 
Goldman Sachs, newspapers reported that the investment bank took 
advantage of a decision by rating agencies to disclose their 
methodologies in rating asset-backed securities.  Using this disclosure, 
Goldman Sachs and other banks were able to reverse engineer rating 
agency models and then obtain higher and unjustified ratings for riskier 
asset-backed securities.114  In short, even regulation outsourced to 
private entities can suffer from regulatory arbitrage.115  These various 
games that financial institutions played with rating agencies assumed 
fresh importance in the context of regulatory capital arbitrage; these 
games further undermined capital regulations. 
Similarly, interpretations of bank regulators that allowed lenders to 
lower their regulatory capital requirements by securitizing assets 
depended on the securitization qualifying as a true sale for bankruptcy 
and accounting purposes.116  Thus the gaming of bankruptcy and 
 
supra note 30, at 443, 448–53 (describing conflict of interest when issuer of securities pays rating 
agencies for rating). 
  Law Professor Frank Partnoy has been a longtime critic of rating agency regulations.  
Professor Partnoy has long argued that regulation is part of the problem.  See, e.g., Frank Partnoy, 
The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets?: Two Thumbs Down for the Credit Rating Agencies, 77 
WASH. U. L.Q. 619, 681 (1999).  Instead of creating incentives for better monitoring, regulators have 
undermined those incentives by granting rating agencies a kind of oligopoly power.  See id. at 698.  
This power stems from the fact that the securitization market, including the market for mortgage-
backed securities, focuses largely on institutional investors.  Kendall, supra note 70, at 15.   
  Many of these institutional investors are restricted by regulation to purchasing only 
securities with an investment-grade credit rating.  E.g., James Hedges, Hedge Fund Transparency, in 
HEDGE FUNDS: STRATEGIES, RISK ASSESSMENT, AND RETURNS 315, 316 (Greg N. Gregoriou et al. 
eds., 2003) (discussing regulations that discourage mutual funds from investing in debt below 
investment grade).  For example, regulations restrict much of the securities investments of many 
pension funds, and regulated financial institutions, including banks and insurance companies, to 
investment-grade debt.  See, e.g., GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, COMMUNITY AND ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT LOANS: SECURITIZATION FACES SIGNIFICANT BARRIERS 41 n.41 (2003) (discussing 
requirements on pension funds); Partnoy, supra, at 700–01 (outlining use by state regulators of rating 
agencies’ ratings in insurance regulations). 
  These “investment-grade” restrictions are designed to ensure the safety of an entity’s assets, 
and, in the case of a bank or other regulated financial institution, to mitigate systemic risk.  Cf. Viral 
V. Acharya, A Theory of Systemic Risk and Design of Prudential Bank Regulation (Jan. 9, 2001) 
(unpublished manuscript) (available for download at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=236401 [https://perma.cc/C8L3-B7DM]) 
(analyzing whether prudential bank regulations, including limitations on investments, mitigates 
systemic risk). 
  These investment-grade regulations, in turn, provide that only rating agencies that have a 
special license from the Securities and Exchange Commission as “Nationally Recognized Statistical 
Rating Organizations” (“NRSROs”) can give an investment-grade rating.  Partnoy, supra, at 623. 
  The handful of NRSROs, and the models they use to rate securities, thus possess great 
responsibility for regulating the riskiness of investments made by a large number of financial 
institutions.  Professor Partnoy contends that rating agencies rent out the regulatory license they 
enjoy by virtue of this web of regulations.  See Partnoy, supra, at 623–24.  
 114. Gretchen Morgenson & Louise Story, Rating Agency Data Aided Wall Street in Deals, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2010 at A1. 
 115. See generally Gerding, Code, Crash, and Open Source, supra note 57. 
 116. MELANIE L. FEIN, SECURITIES ACTIVITIES OF BANKS § 13.04 (3d ed. Supp. 2010). 
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accounting rules also contributed to regulatory capital arbitrage.117 
V.  THE CRISIS AND THE EFFECTS OF REGULATORY CAPITAL 
ARBITRAGE 
Taking a step back from individual arbitrage strategies, a troubling 
picture of the effect of regulatory capital arbitrage emerges.  Although 
the various shadow banking instruments were designed to spread risk, 
most of the credit risk stayed within the financial system.  A 2008 study 
reports that banks, thrifts, government-sponsored entities, and broker-
dealers held $789 billion—or roughly 50%—of the AAA-rated CDO 
tranches outstanding.118  At the same point, banks, broker-dealers and 
monoline bond insurers held $320 billion of the $476 billion of 
subordinated CDO tranches.119  A 2008 International Monetary Fund 
report documented how balance sheets of a sample of ten very large 
financial institutions doubled from 2004 to 2007, yet the implied risk of 
their balance sheets under the Basel Accord registered only a modest 
uptick.120 
This suggests that the most troubling problem with securitization 
(and shadow banking generally) is not that financial institutions 
unloaded high credit risk assets onto non-financial institution investors.  
On the contrary, too much of the toxic risk stayed on the balance sheets 
of financial institutions or was passed from one institution to another.121  
The system did not diffuse risk, but hid, recycled, and concentrated it in 
complex daisy chains.  Securitization only pantomimed its stated role of 
transferring risk in the service of letting banks escape capital rules.  
Professors Acharya and Richardson explain that this evasion of capital 
regulations was the driving force behind securitization in the years 
leading up to the Crisis.  They write: 
[E]specially from 2003 to 2007, the main purpose of securitization was not 
to share risk with investors, but to make an end run around capital-
adequacy regulations.  The net result was to keep the risk concentrated in 
the financial institutions—and, indeed, to keep the risk at a greatly 
magnified level, because of the over-leveraging it allowed.122 
These statistics support the earlier predictions of scholars on the 
pernicious effects of regulatory capital arbitrage.  Well before the Crisis, 
some scholars worried that regulatory capital arbitrage would result in 
 
 117. See supra Part IV.A. 
 118. See Acharya et al., Capital, Contingent Capital, and Liquidity Requirements, supra note 30, 
at 149. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 150 (citing INT’L MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT: 
CONTAINING SYSTEMIC RISKS AND RESTORING FINANCIAL SOUNDNESS 31 (2008) 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfsr/2008/01/pdf/text.pdf [https://perma.cc/9HLT-E6L6]). 
 121. See Hyun Song Shin, Securitisation and Financial Stability, 119 ECON. J. 309 (2009). 
 122. Acharya & Richardson, supra note 71, at 197 (2009). 
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an effective deterioration of risk-based capital standards.123  They 
worried that regulatory capital arbitrage could mask growing financial 
problems at banks and frustrate both market discipline and regulatory 
actions to address failing banks.124  Some scholars attribute the fact that 
many large complex financial institutions that failed during the Crisis—
Bear Stearns, Washington Mutual, Lehman Brothers, Wachovia, and 
Merrill Lynch—actually had higher capital than required by regulation 
to regulatory capital arbitrage.  This arbitrage masked the true 
economic risk of these firms.125  Moreover, regulatory capital arbitrage 
can discourage a true hedging of economic risks.126  As already noted, 
higher leverage can effectively externalize more of a firm’s risk on the 
marketplace and on the government.127 
VI.  CONCLUSION: COMPLEX ADAPTIVE SYSTEMS AND SOLUTIONS, 
SIMPLE AND HIGH TECH 
Regulatory arbitrage, in general, and regulatory capital arbitrage, 
in particular, will remain features of the landscape of the financial 
markets and financial regulation well into the future.  Financial 
institutions and other market participants have strong incentives to 
game financial rules that restrict their risk-taking and profits.  Financial 
institutions have particularly sharp incentives to engage in regulatory 
capital arbitrage. The presence of government guarantees—explicit and 
implicit—and externalities from the failure of financial institutions 
continue to make debt relatively cheaper than equity for financial 
institutions.  This creates a strong impulse for financial institutions to 
lever up, using investment structuring and switching, to sidestep legal 
rules restricting their ability to increase leverage or risk-taking.  
Moreover, the capacity of leverage to turbocharge returns to equity 
holders, including bank managers and traders compensated through 
stock or options, creates internal pressures on the banks to find creative 
and opaque ways to finance themselves through debt. 
This explains the dialectical co-evolution of capital regulations and 
regulatory capital arbitrage described above.  Regulators must impose 
capital requirements to reduce the systemic effects of excessive financial 
institution leverage and the moral hazard from government guarantees.  
However, each and every historical attempt to set capital requirements 
 
 123. Jones, supra note 8, at 49. 
 124. Id. 
 125. See Acharya et al., Capital, Contingent Capital, and Liquidity Requirements, supra note 30, 
at 147. 
 126. Jones, supra note 8, at 37. 
 127. See Acharya et al., Capital, Contingent Capital, and Liquidity Requirements, supra note 30, 
at 157; see also Acharya & Richardson, supra note 71, at 197–98. 
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has resulted in new forms of regulatory capital arbitrage.  The United 
States and Britain worried that their early regulatory capital 
requirements would drive capital overseas to less regulated jurisdictions.  
This resulted in the first Basel Accord.  Yet financial institutions found 
ways to game that agreement’s crude risk-bucket approach.  So bank 
regulators responded with the Basel II Accord and allowed large banks 
to set capital according to their proprietary risk models.  Not 
surprisingly, financial conglomerates used this approach to lower 
effective capital and raise leverage.  Now regulators have rolled out 
Basel III.  To quote Kurt Vonnegut, “and so it goes.”128 
The incentives to engage in regulatory arbitrage and regulatory 
capital arbitrage increase during prolonged market bubbles.  The 
prospect of being shut out of enjoying the increased profits in a booming 
asset market sharpens the legal creativity and appetite for legal risk of 
investors and financial institutions.  In turn, increased regulatory 
arbitrage, particularly of rules like capital requirements that arguably 
might otherwise throttle back lending or investment, can, in turn, 
further inflate a bubble.129 
Addressing the pervasive and recurring effects of regulatory capital 
arbitrage demand both new intellectual frameworks and new policy 
approaches.  This final part of the Article first attempts to reframe the 
problem of regulatory capital arbitrage and its dialectical evolution with 
capital rules in terms of research into complex, adaptive systems.  The 
Article next briefly examines how the upshot of regulatory capital 
arbitrage may be that bank capital requirements and other prudential 
banking regulations may suffer from inherent instability.  Finally, the 
Article describes two policy approaches to addressing this instability, 
specifically: “simple” and “complex.” 
A.  Complex Adaptive Systems 
 A different scholarly lens can reveal deeper patterns in the 
interaction of capital regulation and regulatory capital arbitrage.  
Research into complex adaptive systems may help explain the 
regulatory arbitrage described above.130  Complex adaptive systems are 
the centerpiece of complexity science, a somewhat amorphous, 
interdisciplinary field that engages economists, computer scientists, and 
natural scientists.  These scholars study how simple interactions between 
 
 128. See generally KURT VONNEGUT, SLAUGHTERHOUSE-FIVE (The Dial Press 2005) (1969). 
 129. GERDING, LAW, BUBBLES, AND FINANCIAL REGULATION, supra note 20, at 383. 
 130. For a provocative application of complex adaptive systems to financial institution 
regulation, see Lawrence G. Baxter, Internationalization of Law: The “Complex” Case of Bank 
Regulation, in THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF LAW: LEGISLATING, DECISION-MAKING, PRACTICE 
AND EDUCATION 3 (William Van Caenegem & Mary E. Hiscock eds. 2010). 
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adaptive agents (which could mean anything from investors in a market, 
to organisms in an ecosystem, to cells within an organism) can evolve 
into increasingly intricate and dynamically changing adaptive systems.131  
The ability of agents to adapt to the changes in the system, including 
those caused by the interaction of the agents, leads the overall system—
the market, ecosystem, or organism—to develop in nonlinear ways.132 
Economists have looked at how a financial market represents a 
complex adaptive system133 and may therefore exhibit nonlinear 
behavior134 and suffer bouts of disequilibrium and unpredictable 
swings.135  Accordingly, models of market risk may suffer spectacular 
failures.136 
If a financial market is a complex adaptive system, then so too is a 
regulated financial market.  The agents in the system are financial 
market traders and the regulators looking to govern the risk-taking of 
those traders.  As regulators set rules for the market, the traders (with 
the help of their lawyers) find ways to adapt around these rules or to 
move capital to a less regulated part of the system.  The co-evolution of 
financial regulation and regulatory arbitrage provides an example of 
what scholars of complex adaptive systems call “emergence.”  Legal 
scholar J.B. Ruhl defines emergence as: 
[T]he appearance of unforeseen qualities from the self-organizing 
interaction of large numbers of objects, which cannot be understood 
through study of any one of the objects.  The key to emergence is 
understanding that the emergent behaviors of dynamical systems are high-
level patterns arising from the indescribably complex interaction of lower-
level subsystems. Hence, removing or otherwise changing any interacting 
 
 131. Complex adaptive systems are systems in which multiple independent agents interact with 
one another.  The capacity of the agents to adapt to changes in the system causes the system to 
evolve into progressively more complex forms and to change in a non-linear manner.  Simon A. 
Levin, Complex Adaptive Systems: Exploring the Known, Unknown and the Unknowable, 40 BULL. 
AM. MATH. SOC’Y 3, 4 (2002) (defining complex adaptive systems). 
 132. Id. 
 133. See, e.g., Cars H. Hommes, Financial Markets as Nonlinear Adaptive Evolutionary 
Systems, 1 QUANTITATIVE FIN. 149 (2001). 
 134. Risk models or regulations that rely on linear causality falter when applied to complex 
adaptive systems.  Professor J.B. Ruhl has written extensively on the failures of law to manage non-
linear causality.  See J.B. Ruhl, Thinking of Environmental Law as a Complex Adaptive System: 
How to Clean Up the Environment by Making a Mess of Environmental Law, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 933, 
979 (1997) (criticizing environmental statutes for this flaw). 
 135. John Foster, From Simplistic to Complex Systems in Economics, 29 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 
873 (2005).  Many complex, adaptive systems may tend towards disequilibrium because of the 
concept of emergence, which is described supra note 132.  Ruhl, supra note 134, at 990–91. 
 136. See generally Alejandro Reveiz Herault & Sebastian Rojas, The Case for Active 
Management from the Perspective of Complexity Theory, 495 BORRADORES DE ECONOMÍA 11 
(2008), http://www.banrep.gov.co/docum/ftp/borra495.pdf [https://perma.cc/879D-8NU5]; cf. CARLO 
C. JAEGER ET AL., RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND RATIONAL ACTION (2001).  Legal scholars have 
analyzed how individuals severely underestimate risk when confronted with complex adaptive 
systems.  E.g., Lawrence A. Cunningham, Too Big to Fail: Moral Hazard in Auditing and the Need to 
Restructure the Industry Before it Unravels, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1698, 1724–26 (2006) (discussing 
accounting firms’ underestimation of their legal exposure); see also Lawrence A. Cunningham, From 
Random Walks to Chaotic Crashes, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 546 (1994). 
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component of the system potentially changes the entire system since the 
interactions leading to the global emergent behaviors may no longer be 
possible.137 
Emergence and the complex interactions of agents on the micro level 
frustrate the prediction of changes to the overall system.138 
 One could analogize the complex adaptive system of a regulated 
financial market to a petri dish in which traders and regulators adapt to 
one another.  This interaction may make predictions about the stability 
of financial markets and regulation hard enough in normal times.  Asset 
price bubbles place that petri dish under a heat lamp.  The heat creates 
the conditions for frenzies of regulatory arbitrage that destabilize the 
architecture of financial regulation.139 
B.  The Inherent Instability of Capital Regulations 
The system tends toward complexity and capital regulations tend to 
be unstable because of the congenital incentives of financial firms to 
increase leverage.  As noted in Part III above, those incentives stem not 
merely from the moral hazard created by government guarantees, 
explicit and implicit, of banks and their creditors, but moreover from the 
fundamental market failure those guarantees aim to remedy: the 
externalities that banks threaten to impose on the wider economy when 
they fail.  These potentially severe externalities mean governments feel 
compelled to backstop banks and their creditors, which creates an 
incentive for banks to over-lever, take excessive risk and find ways 
around capital requirements.  These externalities threaten to destabilize 
not only capital rules, but a spectrum of prudential regulations that limit 
bank risk-taking and mitigate systemic risk.  These externalities have 
also sparked a scholarly gold rush to identify the conditions that created 
the “Quiet Period,” the decades between the end of the Second World 
War and the 1970s in which the architecture of financial institution 
regulation remained remarkably stable and few firms sought to engage 
in massive and sustained regulatory arbitrage of the rules of the game.140 
 
 137. J.B. Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm for the Dynamical Law-And-Society System: 
A Wake-Up Call for Legal Reductionism and the Modern Administrative State, 45 DUKE L.J. 849, 
877–78 (1996) (internal quotations omitted). 
 138. See id. 
 139. GERDING, LAW, BUBBLES, AND FINANCIAL REGULATION, supra note 20, at 240–47 
(describing how dynamics of bubbles promote conditions for regulatory arbitrage of financial 
regulations that restrict lending and investment). 
 140. E.g., Prasad Krishnamurthy, Regulating through Rents (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
with the author); see generally GARY B. GORTON, SLAPPED BY THE INVISIBLE HAND: THE PANIC OF 
2007 54–55 (2010) (providing explanation for the Quiet Period); GARY B. GORTON, 
MISUNDERSTANDING FINANCIAL CRISES: WHY WE DIDN’T SEE ONE COMING 10–28, 125–33 (2012) 
(defining historical characteristics of a “Quiet Period” in banking system, and analyzing conditions 
leading to post-war “Quiet Period”). 
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C.  Solutions 
Unless and until those conditions can be identified and recreated, 
policymakers must cobble together responses to the continuously 
evolving threat that regulatory capital arbitrage poses to bank capital 
regulations and that regulatory arbitrage more generally poses to any 
prudential, systemic-risk reducing regulation.  Conceptually, 
policymakers can proceed down one of two broad avenues. 
1.  Simple: Dogs and Frisbees 
First, regulators can address the threat of regulatory capital 
arbitrage with broad simple rule structures that might be labelled 
(affectionately or not) as “stone axe.”  For example, Professors Admati 
and Hellwig argue for relatively simple leverage caps that are fixed at 
very high levels.141  High capital would not only absorb more bank 
losses, it would also compensate for some erosion of legal rules by 
regulatory arbitrage.  As noted above, Heidi Mandanis Schooner adds a 
procedural, yet still elegant twist to this reform proposal.  She argues for 
a presumption of high capital requirements for all banks, which an 
individual bank might convince a regulator to lower with sufficient 
evidence that the bank’s risk profile is small.142 
Professor Schooner’s elegant approach might be taken several 
steps further.  Policymakers might use presumptions in a host of ways to 
address regulatory capital arbitrage.  For example, new financial 
instruments or complex financing transactions might be presumptively 
off limits for a bank absent it demonstrating to regulators that these 
innovations do not pose a risk to the bank or to the financial system.  A 
bank might also have to show that a complex financing transaction has 
economic substance beyond gaming regulations.  Regulators might 
sunset approvals of financial innovations or automatically reset capital 
rules to high levels unless a bank can periodically produce evidence that 
a complex instrument or transaction continues to be low risk and have 
economic substance.  This type of presumption meshes with a wave of 
scholarship that calls for greater use of licensing regimes in financial 
regulation.143 
 There is quite a bit of intellectual heft behind simple rules.  For 
example, Andrew Haldane, in his famous “Dog and the Frisbee” 
 
 141. ADMATI & HELLWIG, supra note 1. 
 142. Schooner, supra note 7. 
 143. Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl, An FDA for Financial Innovation: Applying the Insurable 
Interest Doctrine to Twenty-First-Century Financial Markets, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1307 (2015); Saule 
T. Omarova, License to Deal: Mandatory Approval of Complex Financial Products, 90 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 63 (2012).  See also Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. 
REV 1 (2008). 
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speech,144 makes a strong case for simple regulatory approaches to the 
complex problems of modern financial institutions and markets.  Simple 
rules have several virtues.  They do not overtax the cognitive abilities 
and institutional capacities of regulators.  Regulators are less prone to 
behavioral biases and other cognitive errors when implementing and 
enforcing simple rules.145  Simple rules also have political virtues.  They 
are easier to understand, explain, justify to the public, and defend 
publicly, and they make it easier to monitor regulator behavior. 
 However, simple, blunt rules have drawbacks.  Simple but much 
higher capital requirements invite financial institutions to find ways to 
load their balance sheet with riskier assets.  Moreover, if capital 
requirements are sufficiently high, they encourage investors to move 
their money away from regulated banks to less regulated competitors.  
These competitors could make investments more freely and offer their 
shareholders the possibility of the turbocharged returns that come with 
leverage.  This sort of investment switching can be seen in the rise of 
money market mutual funds in the 1970s.  Those funds attracted 
investors away from banks who could offer only regulation-capped 
interest rates on deposits.146  The concern with investment switching and 
regulatory arbitrage is voiced by critics who argue that increased 
regulation will drive finance further into the less regulated 
“shadows.”147  There are many reasons not to take this argument at face 
value: not least because banks and regulated entities have been key 
enablers of the shadow banking system.148  Nevertheless, higher bank 
capital requirements will create strong incentives for banks to engage in 
regulatory capital arbitrage,149 including strategies employing less-
regulated affiliates.150 Regulation might then need to address capital 
flows into parallel financial systems that are less regulated than 
depository banking but perform the same economic functions and 
threaten the same systemic risk spillover effects. 
 
 144. Andrew G. Haldane, Executive Director, Financial Stability, Bank of England, & Vasileios 
Madouros, Economist, Bank of England, Remarks at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City’s 
366th economic policy symposium, “The Changing Policy Landscape,” Jackson Hole, WY (Aug. 31, 
2012) http://www.bis.org/review/r120905a.pdf [https://perma.cc/T7K6-6DDH]. 
 145. Id. 
 146. William A. Birdthistle, Breaking Bucks in Money Market Funds, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 1155. 
 147. E.g., Gary Gorton et al., The Safe-Asset Share, 102 AMER. ECON. REV. 101 (2012). 
 148. Erik F. Gerding, The Shadow Banking System and its Legal Origins, (Jan. 24, 2012) 
(unpublished manuscript) (available for download at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1990816 [https://perma.cc/56XQ-ZVSB]). 
 149. GERDING, LAW, BUBBLES, AND FINANCIAL REGULATION, supra note 20. 
 150. See Saule T. Omarova, From Gramm-Leach-Bliley to Dodd-Frank; the Unfulfilled Promise 
of Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act, 89 N.C. L. Rev. 1683 (2011) (detailing strategies by bank 
holding companies to transfer subsidies from bank subsidiaries to less regulated affiliates). 
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2.  High Tech: Adaptive Regulations and Adaptive Regulators 
The alternative to simple rules is a complex or “high tech” 
approach to regulatory capital arbitrage.  Regulators could attempt to 
match the complex and adaptive nature of regulatory capital arbitrage 
with increasingly complex and adaptive rules.  Regulators could seek to 
adjust capital regulations continuously and dynamically to adapt to 
evolutions in bank risk-taking and trading strategies, as well as other 
financial innovations. 
A dynamic, adaptive regulatory approach requires dynamic and 
adaptive regulators.  This, in turn, requires that regulators will have the 
legal authority, the incentives, and the capacities—both cognitive and 
institutional—to keep pace with industry.  Legal scholarship has only 
begun to consider the institutional design questions that are central to 
endowing regulators with this type of authority, incentives, and 
capacities.  On the bright side, scholars have already proposed creative 
mechanisms.  For example, Brett McDonnell and Dan Schwarcz 
advocate for an institutional system of “regulatory contrarians” or 
gadflies operating within regulatory agencies that would push for new 
regulations.151  Eric Posner argues that cost-benefit analysis of capital 
regulations, if properly done, might produce results that force regulators 
to raise capital.152  Although this last proposal presupposes that 
regulators would act within an institutional environment that gives them 
the requisite incentives and resources and immunizes them from 
political pressures and cognitive errors.153  I have proposed elsewhere a 
range of institutional mechanisms to make financial regulators more 
proactive, including the following: countercyclical regulator budgets; 
think tanks, graduate colleges and policy planning staffs within agencies; 
and greater use of regulatory peer review systems.154 
Yet all of these mechanisms might improve regulation even if 
policymakers adopt simple approaches to regulatory capital arbitrage.  
A mix of simple rules and smart financial regulators might yield the best 
results against the formidable foe of regulatory arbitrage. 
 
 151. Brett McDonnell & Daniel Schwarcz, Regulatory Contrarians, 89 N.C. L. Rev. 1629 (2011). 
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Bank Regulators Determine Capital-Adequacy Requirements?,” 83 U. CHI. L. REV. ONLINE __ 
(forthcoming 2016). 
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